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M y pleasant assignment this morning is to talk about the future of com-puter network attack under international law. Any prediction is diffi-
cult to make, but the hardest thing of all to predict is the future. If! wanted to 
play it safe I would just stand here and be quiet for thirty minutes. Yet we all 
know that if there is one prediction that can be asserted with a confidence level 
of 100%, it is-no matter what the topic might be-any law professor in this 
country who is given the job of talking about it will talk about it. 
There has already been a lot of talk this week about rules of international law, 
and I sense a certain amount of discomfort about the old, received rules ofinter-
national law. We have been cited rules dating from 1949,1945,1929, and back 
as far as 1907 and 1899. Somehow they seem archaic when compared with a rev-
olutionary new technology. Professor Y oram Dinstein has advised the conven-
ing of an international conference to update the old humanitarian rules of 
warfare. But pending the replacement of existing rules by new ones, Professor 
Dinstein contends that the existing rules will serve us well enough if we apply 
them as written. He appears to view these rules as a kind of international 
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legislation. I do not completely share that point of view. Perhaps this betrays my 
common law bias, but I think there is a kind of spirit of international law that 
shapes the rules on the books and provides a basis for interpreting them. 
This spirit is evolutionary. Being aware of it gives us a basis for predicting how 
the rules of international law may bend and change to fit new situations. Since 
any international crisis will appear quite different to decision-makers on the in-
side than all the previous ones they have experienced, simulated or studied, it is 
indeed a kind of rigid thinking to say we should treat this crisis by applying the 
same rules we applied to the last one. It would be somewhat like accusing gener-
als offighting the previous war. But rules oflaware like that; as words on a paper 
or on a screen, they do not change by themselves, they stay the same. And they 
were obviously fashioned to cover past situations. Thus, I argue that we cannot 
take our stand solely upon the rules of international law as written. These rules 
have to be interpreted in light of new circumstances. 
And yet it is clear that if we simply change the old rules to apply to new situa-
tions, the rules will be sapped ofall their vitality. There is no use having any rules 
oflaw at all if they can be changed at will; that would amount to anarchy. There-
fore, I want to argue that we are constrained in the degree oflatitude that we can 
give to the interpretation of old rules to fit new situations. And this constraint 
comes, I argue, from a good faith appreciation of the structure of international 
law itse1£ 
What is the structure of international law? We begin by recognizing that it is, 
and must be, a self-perpetuating coherent set of rules that operate within the 
arena of international relations. Because it is dependent upon a multi-State envi-
ronment for its own existence, international law consists of rules that are de-
signed to maintain the peace and stability of those States, for total anarchic war is 
the absence of rules. International law opts for stability by ensuring that its rules 
minimize the friction among States and provide for peaceful resolution of dis-
putes. If war breaks out despite its rules, then international law attempts to con-
tain the war, minimize the damage caused by war, and provide for a secure peace 
following the war. An example of a set of international legal rules providing for 
the containment of war are the complex and realistic rules of neutrality, fash-
ioned over centuries, which specifY the acts that neutral nations mayor may not 
take during a war in order to maintain their neutrality. And a classic example of a 
rule favoring an agreement to stop the war is the rule that treaties of peace are 
valid even though the losing side could be said to have been coerced into signing 
the treaty by the threat of continued war if it did not sign. 
Although the content of the rules of international law has not changed quali-
tatively over the course of the past five thousand years, existing rules have been 
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adjusted and modified to meet new situations and contingencies. This adjust-
ment operates through an elaborate system of customary law that modifies rules 
in light of feedback mechanisms. These mechanisms include courts, foreign 
offices interacting with each other (the" dedoublement jonctionnel") , diplomatic 
communications, international legal conferences and codification conventions, 
negotiations of bilateral and multilateral treaties, and so forth. International law 
is, in brief, a cybernetic system. Its rules are useful only if they are func-
tional-that is, only if they promote the stability of the system. The feedback 
mechanisms, which are the hallmark of cybernetic systems, continuously mea-
sure whether rules of the system operate to resolve disputes rather than aggravate 
them. If a rule has a tendency to aggravate disputes, then it is reinterpreted, mod-
ified, or in drastic cases overruled and replaced by a rule that stabilizes the system. 
It follows that too rigid an interpretation of any given rule could lead to a 
rupture in the system. Let me call an absolutely rigid interpretation a "robotic" 
interpretation. A robot will interpret a rule exacdy, without taking into ac-
count its real-world consequences.1 For example, the Standing Rules of En-
gagement for US Forces of October 1, 1994, provides in its first rule that a 
military commander has the right to use all necessary means to defend the mili-
tary unit, and that none of the remaining rules in the ROE can limit this inher-
ent right. If a robot were programmed with this rule alone, it would not 
hesitate to employ a hugely disproportionate weapon in the defense of its unit, 
including a nuclear missile that could start a global conflagration. Thus, the first 
rule of the ROE cannot be given a robotic interpretation. The rule is instead 
directed to a commander who is familiar with many other rules within the 
ROE, ,vith the requirements of warfare, and with the general principle of mil-
itary proportionality. In short, the rule on the books was made by humans with 
the often unarticulated premise that humans like them would interpret the 
rule. A military rule presupposes a military interpreter.2 
Sometimes the laws of war build terminological flexibility right into their 
own language. Many of the older rules of warfare, for example, prohibit acts that 
are "not justified by military necessity." Such rules also betoken the good mili-
tary judgment of a human being. Legal restraints on warmaking stem from the 
need to keep the international system stable. Many years ago Quincy Wright put 
this another way: the goal of the military during a war is not just to win the war 
but to win the subsequent peace. Ifforce is used that is not justified by military 
necessity, the seeds will be sown offuture revenge; hence, a stable peace may not 
have been secured. "Military necessity" should be construed as "necessary to 
win the engagement at hand" and not to demonstrate brutality by unrestrained 
killing of enemy civilians. 
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The cybernetic system ofinternationallaw is thus a purposive system. Its rules 
cannot be interpreted literally or applied mechanically because each rule is sim-
ply an indication of how the system should deal with disruptions that may arise. 
Our bodies are purposive systems; if surgery is needed to remove a tumor, the 
surgeon operates with as little damage to the surrounding tissue as possible, for 
obviously the idea is to remove the tumor and not to kill the patient. A ship is an 
example of a self-contained purposive system. The primary purpose of a purpos-
ive system is survival-persistence through time. 
In order to survive, purposive systems attempt to maintain systemic equilib-
rium. When our bodies are invaded by a flu virus, our temperature rises so as to 
provide a hostile environment for the invaders; when the virus is defeated, our 
temperatures return to normal. Similar servomechanisms exist on larger military 
vessels; a torpedo hit on the hull may trigger an automatic seal-off of the com-
partment that is being flooded. A thermostat is one of the simplest servomecha-
nisms; there are many more we can think of 
Purposive systems are able to survive and to reverse disequilibrating interrup-
tions because they have elaborate intemal communications systems. We do not 
have to tell our bodies to raise our temperature; our blood stream carries the mes-
sage of outside virus invaders to our central nervous subsystem which communi-
cates with the subconscious parts of our brains and in effect turns up the heat. On 
board a ship, the intemal communications are elaborate and highly structured to 
carry messages of the ship's condition to all hands. There are £ril-safe mechanisms 
that operate by default in case the intra-human messages are disrupted. 
he communications on board a ship are structured by elaborate rules,jurisdic-
tional assignments, protocols, and regulations. These constitute the internal laws 
of the system. Any person on board who acts in a way that jeopardizes the sur-
vival of the ship is immediately arrested; any person who acts to upset the equi-
librium of the ship is also stopped. All the everyday rules and regulations of the 
ship are designed to actualize the two primary goals of persistence through time 
and the maintenance of systemic equilibrium. 
Just as a ship's rules are designed to maintain the integrity of the floating mili-
tary unit, the rules of international law are designed to maintain the integrity and 
peace of the States of the world in their international relations. The essence of all 
these rules is the communication of information. Naval rules are worthless un-
less communicated. The equilibrium of our bodies is maintained by an elaborate 
system of neuron communications into and out of the brain and spinal column. 
My thesis is based upon the signal importance of the communicative aspect of 
rules. Without communication the rules do not work. And if the rules do not 
work, the entire system can break down, with adverse consequences to everyone. 
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The importance of conununication in international law is illustrated by one of 
its most ancient rules: the personal inununity of diplomats and ambassadors. Even 
during wartime nations realized the importance of keeping open the channels of 
conununication with their enemies. Diplomatic inununity under international 
law is well known. The relation to Internet conununications is obvious. I would 
like to discuss a more subtle and perhaps more illuminating practice allowed by 
international law that also has a long history-letters of marque and reprisal. 
Back in the days when there were no international courts, no international 
peacekeeping organizations, and nations did their best to avoid war because of the 
unforeseeable calamities that war could bring, a curious practice of a kind of limited 
private law arose. Key to this practice is what might be termed "unilateral conunu-
nication." A message is sent out that is intended to be received, but a response is not 
required. The message is contained in a letter of marque and reprisal. 
To envisage the situation, imagine five hundred years ago that merchant M 
in nation A was one of a class of rich international traders, importing and ex-
porting goods. In the course of his trade, M sends a caravan of silks, which he 
purchased in A, into nation B to be sold. With the selling price (in B's cur-
rency, of course), M intends to buy goods in B that are relatively scarce back in 
A, and transport those goods back to A to be sold there. In every transaction, as 
usual, M takes a percentage for himse1£ M and his fellow merchants are very 
important to the king of A because taxes on their profits are the king's primary 
source of revenue. 
Now let us assume that a greedy provincial governor in B, seeing the large 
amount of money that M has obtained by selling the silks in his province, decides 
to levy a 100% tax on the money that M's trading activities in B have amassed. 
M's employees in B are simply merchants; they do not have the power to resist 
the provincial governor. As a result, their capital as well as their profits are confis-
cated and they return to A empty-handed. 
An outraged M reports to the king of A the" denial of justice" within B. But 
the king does not want to start a war against nation B. There are too many risks 
and uncertainties in war, and, in addition, the king simply cannot afford to fi-
nance an all-out war. True, the king admits, the queen of B does not want war 
either, and for the same reasons. But once a war between two sovereign nations 
is started, who knows what the result will be? 
So we assume that at that point, M offers to mount a private mercenary attack 
against B. In that way, by looting and pillaging, M can get his money back while 
teaching B a lesson. Such an action would probably drive the king into an un-
wanted war. And the king may not be quite powerful enough to stop M from 
doing it, especially ifM recruits his fellow tradesmen to help in the enterprise. 
63 
International Law, Cybernetics, and Cyberspace 
Thus the stage is set for a deal between the king and M. The king wants M to 
go ahead but in a limited way, one that would be sufficiently justified so that the 
queen of B would not feel honor-bound to go to war to resist it. The only thing 
that would be so justified would be what Aristotle called compensatory justice. 
M should have the right to be compensated for his losses plus the cost of obtain-
ing that compensation. So the king issues to M a letter of reprisal. The letter 
contains the terms of M's planned expedition into nation B. It specifies the geo-
graphical limitation of the expedition-in this case, the particular province 
whose governor took away M's assets and profits. It specifies the amount that can 
be recovered-in this case, property and other valuables equal in amount to M's 
losses plus interest plus the cost of paying the mercenaries. It specifies the persons 
against whom the losses can be recovered-in this case, probably, all officials and 
all private citizens in the province, perhaps with officials coming first. The fact 
that innocent civilians are going to be robbed to pay for M's losses is un-
avoidable. In principle, they should seek recompense from the queen of B, who 
should levy against the governor of the province and who, in the future, should 
ensure that none of his subordinates mistreat foreign traders in this fashion. 
M's motivation in obtaining the letter of reprisal is not so much so that he can 
show it to officials (or the queen) in B during his mercenary expedition there, 
but rather to legitimize his e)".'pedition in his home country A. After all, if M pro-
ceeds without the king's approval, he might eventually return to A only to face 
arrest for his private breach of the peace. Moreover, M's ability to recruit merce-
naries within A will be greatly facilitated by the legitimacy of the letter of repri-
sal; otherwise, a potential recruit would reasonably worry about arrest in A 
when the expedition is completed. Therefore, as I have said, the letter is just a 
one-way communication within nation A. It is not necessary for the queen of B 
to read it; its "power" is exhausted once M receives it from the king of A. But if 
M respects the conditions of his reprisal raid into B, then the queen of B can see, 
by the results, that M confined himself to the province of which he complained 
that his assets were confiscated by the governor, and that M helped himself to 
compensatory justice. 
In this fashion, many limited wars were fought under the aegis ofletters of 
marque and reprisal. Sometimes the mere issuance of such letters was enough to 
provoke the monarchs of neighboring countries to offer restitution in order to 
avoid the impending mercenary raid into their territory. And naturally, over the 
course of time, the conditions for the issuance ofletters of marque and reprisal 
were spelled out in treaties of peace. The Treaty of Westphalia recognizes the 
potential legitimacy oflimited armed attacks as reprisals for denial of justice. Far-
ther along in time, reprisal raids were replaced by judicial procedures. By the 
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1920s, for example, the United States and Mexico set up a Joint Arbitration Tri-
bunal which setded all outstanding claims between American citizens against 
Mexico on the one hand, and Mexican citizens against the United States on the 
other. Since payments to the aggrieved plaintiffS were secured by net-net trans-
actions between the two governments, only the monetary difference at the very 
end had to be paid in specie. 
This subsequent history shows that the early letters of marque and reprisal,3 
by allowing limited war, operated as a deterrence to general war. When people 
are robbed, they need restitution. When they are robbed by another country, 
the alternative is either war or self-help. The history of the use of letters of 
marque and reprisal constitutes an example of my general point that even a war 
can be, in some circumstances, not systemically dis equilibrating, but rather a 
method of preserving and restoring systemic equilibrium. If all wars in the fu-
ture are intended to be limited wars (we can hardly contemplate a world war in 
this era of weapons of mass destruction, though we must be ever vigilant that it 
will not erupt by accident), then we need to be very careful about preserving 
the communications network that in the past has been instrumental in keeping 
wars limited. 
Thus, I contend that the main lesson for present purposes of this short his-
tory of letters of marque and reprisal is the importance of communica-
tion-both internally and externally---as a means of limiting warfare. In 
considering the escalatory potential of destroying computer Internet traffic in 
future conflicts, we should not just look at the disruption of communications 
with the enemy, but also consider the severe negative consequences to our-
selves if the disruption cannot be pinpointed and spreads to affect the network 
in its entirety. For although a letter of marque and reprisal signified an agree-
ment between the sovereign and one of his subjects (the king of A and his sub-
ject M in my example), it was also meant as a communication to a foreign 
country (to the queen ofB, in my example). While it was desirable that the 
foreign sovereign read the letter, it was not necessary. Many communications 
today are of this one-way type. In the recent NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, 
for example, NATO leaders held numerous press conferences which they 
were confident were being monitored by Milosevic and others in Belgrade. 
Limited-war aims must be communicated to the enemy whenever possible. 
They must be credible (as, indeed, were the letters of marque and reprisal, 
which were not casually issued by any means). And they must be continuously 
communicated, for when the enemy is suffering its darkest days it must be for-
tified by the belief that its leadership continues to hold the key to armistice and 
a peaceful setdement.4 
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Of course, no one can foresee what will cause future wars to break out, but 
among the causes that have led to wars has been the need to protect by armed 
force the lives of innocent persons in foreign countries. When those innocent 
lives were a country's own citizens, then intervention to protect them has been 
a common casus belli for several centuries. Only recendy has intervention 
extended from nationals to non-nationals. As I contended in an article in 1982, 
intervention of the latter type is designed to protect our "internationals."5 Our 
internationals are people everywhere, with whom we share a mutual com-
mitment of protection under the developing international law of human 
rights. 
Once any war has begun, the international system tries to bring the system 
back to equilibrium. Thus, we have in international law the phenomenon of the 
humanitarian laws of war. Occasionally I have had the feeling during this confer-
ence that some military planners and targeters appear to believe that the laws of 
war are an evil imposed by the lawyers and politicians, and that their job is to ad-
here to the letter of the rules while violating the spirit. They seem to say that the 
most important goal in war is to win it as soon as possible--and indeed there is a 
logic to that position. Ending a war quickly will often save many lives. The 
problem is that nations that get an upper hand during a war often convince 
themselves that the quickest way to end the war is to terrorize the enemy's civil-
ian population. I think that General Curtis LeMay's terror bombings ofTo1.)'o 
suburbs in the spring of1945 were well-intentioned in this regard. Nevertheless, 
those raids constitute, for me, the clearest example of a war crime in the entire 
Second World War. What did the bombing "communicate" to the people ofJa-
pan? That they should surrender unconditionally to an enemy who was ruthless 
enough to drop flaming napalm on women and children living in wooden 
homes? If LeMay believed he was saying, "Surrender now and we won't keep 
on doing this," he may in fact have communicated "Better to die than surrender 
to the devil incarnate." What the humanitarian laws of war do is to take this kind 
of calculation away from those who would emulate General LeMay. The laws of 
war prohibit the deliberate targeting of civilians. I think in the judgment of most 
observers, military and civilian, the exercise of this kind of restraint during a war 
is more likely to lead to a quick peace and, similarly, to a lasting peace. 
Moreover, from the international systemic viewpoint, given the fact that war 
itself may be a necessary equilibrating adjustment to preserve deeper systemic 
values, prolonging a war is not necessarily a bad thing. It may be important for 
systemic value preservation to prosecute the war the right way even if doing so 
prolongs the war. This is perhaps a deeper reason for ruling out the deliberate 
terror bombing of civilians. 
66 
Anthony D' Amato 
But the viewpoint of the international system is not the only possible 
viewpoint. You can obtain the same result from the point of view of a nation 
looking outward at the international system. For if the maintenance of the sys-
tem is necessary for lasting peace and order, then each nation partakes of that sys-
temic goal in its own foreign policy. The systemic viewpoint is primarily a useful 
heuristic that enables us to predict the ways in which the system itself strives to 
maintain its equilibrium. Once we have identified the ways, each country's na-
tional interest is served in facilitating them. 
I have mentioned so far the rules of diplomatic immunity and the history of 
letters of marque and reprisal as two of the ways that the international system rec-
ognizes disruptions to the system and is able to communicate effectively to re-
store equilibrium. A third mechanism is that customary international law 
permits espionage. Although each nation may punish spies, they are often ex-
changed for a nation's own spies who have been caught by the exchanging 
country. It would have been easy for international law to have generated a rule 
prohibiting espionage, but the fact that it allows for espionage is a further strong 
affirmation of the importance of the exchange of information . There have been 
many instances in which a nation's military posture appeared bellicose to a 
neighbor, yet intelligence networks exposed the reality that there was no belli-
cose intention. Without that information, the neighboring country might have 
launched a preemptive attack, starting a war by mistake. Even when a nation is 
attempting to start a war against its neighbor, the international system is well 
served by intelligence information that allows the neighbor to get prepared for 
an attack. Preparation often dissuades the attacker from going ahead. None of 
this is to say that the exchange of information prevents all wars from breaking 
out. But it has stopped some wars that would have been the result of a mutual 
mistake, and it has served to limit wars that have already broken out by convey-
ing information as to military intentions. 
In recent years observers have been somewhat surprised by the slow and de-
liberate way the Security Council has conveyed to countries such as Iraq and 
Yugoslavia the intentions of the major powers if those countries did not cease 
and desist their unlawful acts. The clarity of communications is probably respon-
sible for a greater reduction in casualties than would have occurred if the UN's 
motives and intentions had been kept secret. 
Where do these arguments lead, in terms of international law? They lead me 
to predict that attacks on the Internet will soon be seen as clearly illegal under 
international law. Maybe customary international law has already reached that 
position. No matter what sh<?rt-term military advantage might be seen in dis-
rupting another country's Internet system, the disruption may spread to the 
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point where it is totally counterproductive. But even if it can be kept con-
tained within the target State, it nevertheless violates, in my view, the interna-
tional system's attempt to end the war and win the peace. In a sense-although 
I do not want to be taken literally on this-disrupting the Internet is like 
unleashing biological warfare: the limits are unpredictable and the method is 
inhumane. What is inhumane about disrupting a target State's Internet com-
munications is that it deprives innocent people within that target State from 
the only possibly effective means they have of obtaining e:l\.1:ernal information 
and using it to communicate with each other, possibly to oppose the war from 
within. In the recent NATO attack on Belgrade, some citizens of that city 
were able to obtain news of the war from nongovernmental sources.6 Unfor-
tunately NATO targeted some of the Belgradian communications facilities. I 
think that was a mistake; it set a precedent that could backfire and it did not 
noticeably shorten the war.7 Whether that targeting was illegal is not a ques-
tion that will be addressed in any foreseeable forum. But I believe that in-
formed international legal opinion will in the near future weigh in on the side 
of the illegality of attacks against the Internet. 
I believe this because the stability of the international system is dependent 
upon the free and efficient flow of information within and among the units that 
make up the system. The more freedom of international communication we 
have, the less the likelihood of war and other disruptions to the stability of the inter-
national system. The global Internet, with its already achieved interconnectivity 
across national boundaries, is a natural heir to the rules of diplomatic immunity, 
letters of marque and reprisal, legality of espionage and intelligence-gathering, and 
many other communicative aspects of international law. 
I am not claiming that during a war there would be a prohibition against dis-
rupting the enemy's command-and-control communications system. If that sys-
tem is separate from the Internet, it is fair game as it always has been. However, if 
the enemy is instead using the Internet itself for its military command and con-
trol system, then why disrupt it when a better alternative is to break through its 
code? Of course, in an actual conflict the military commander on the ground 
will decide whether such an alternative is better. That is why I am making the 
stronger point that a rule of absolute prohibition ofInternet disruption is in the 
best interests of both sides in the long run and therefore is likely to be soon rec-
ognized as a foundational principle of international customary law.8 
Finally, I predict that in the near future we will see massive public support 
throughout the world for the inviolability of the Internet. Although a very re-
cent phenomenon, the Internet in my view is securing for itself a place in public 
consciousness that will be impossible to dislodge. Indeed, the Internet has 
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become one of our vital national interests. It will be something we will have to 
protect in the event of a war. It is not just a mechanism like previous communi-
cations systems (the telephone, the radio, and television). Instead, it has fostered 
a new kind of community awareness and empowerment. 
I hope it does not sound too much like science fiction to say that some people 
already are living in virtual communities. Their chat room partners come from 
all over the world, people who share similar interests. We will see an increasingly 
specialized and fine-tuned system of chat rooms where we will be able to see on 
our computer screens the faces of the people with whom we are communicat-
ing-GeoCities in real time in full color. People who live in these virtual com-
munities also live in real communities; they have dual citizenship. A person can 
be an American and also a citizen of America On-Line; another can be a citizen 
of Ecuador and Excite; another of the Netherlands and Netscape; and another a 
dual citizen of Yemen and Yahoo. People are now able to buy and sell goods di-
rectly from each other-foodstuffi from exotic places, native works of art and 
artifacts (which are skyrocketing in price on the Internet), travel, and services. 
People can play games against opponents from all over the world. Many people 
are finding the Internet passionately consuming of their spare time, and others 
are finding a way to make a living on the Internet-either creating technology, 
or investing, or buying and selling, or providing the one thing in business trans-
actions that computers are still deficient in-a human touch. 
I have exaggerated my point, of course, but in this risky game of prediction we 
sometimes have to think outlandishly. As the world shrinks in size, as commun-
ication and knowledge-sharing become the key concepts of the twenty-first 
century, the Internet will increasingly be valued as a precious resource, the 
"heritage of mankind" in the words of international law. For this reason, as well as 
the systemic considerations I outlined earlier, I think that computer network attack 
will soon be the subject of an outright prohibition under customary intemational law. 
Notes 
1. Of course, a list of "real world consequences" can be programmed into the robot in the fust 
place, in which case the robot will take those consequences into account. But if the consequences are 
not foreseen by the human programmer at the time of the prograrnmin~which is the usual case in 
war where surprises are part of the strategy of war-then the robot will simply not know about them 
and will not take them into account. At the present and reasonably foreseeable state of computer 
technology, a computer cannot "see" and "analyze" the real world and "evaluate" whether a given 
operation could be counterproductive in terms of its foreseeable real world consequences. 
2. It is not clear, however, whether the rules contained in the Internal Revenue Code 
presuppose human interpreters, even though it is often claimed that IRS agents are human 
interpreters. 
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3. Even the Constitution of the United States gives Congress the power to issue letters of 
marque and reprisal (although the power was actually exercised only during the sea war of 1800 
with France, and it was not a "classic" situation of self-help, but rather a roundabout way of 
enlisting the help of private vessels in a national war). 
4. Controversy remains whether the Allied insistence upon "unconditional surrender" 
unnecessarily prolonged W orId War II. Of course, in 1945 German and Japanese leaders did not 
know about the potential of being tried as war criminals. If they had been able to foresee 
Nuremberg and the Military Tribunal for the Far East, would they have surrendered at all? I discuss 
some of the problems of negotiating a peace when the negotiators themselves may find themselves 
indicted for war crimes once the peace is established in Anthony D'Amato, Peace v. Accountability in 
Bosnia, 88 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 500 (1994). 
5. Anthony D'Amato, 11ze Concept ojHuman Rights in Intemational Law, 82 COLUl'v1BIA LAW 
REVIEW 1110 (1982). 
6. It was in NATO's interest to accurately inform Serbian citizens about the war and about 
NATO's limited war aims. Consider what happened in the first half of1945 inJapan. The Japanese 
people were incessantly reassured by the press that the Allies were on the verge ofbeing beaten and 
peace was imminent. Well, the papers were right about the imminence of peace, they just had the 
sides mixed up. If the Internet had been invented at that time, there would have been no way for 
the Japanese people to have been fooled by the Japanese controlled media. Our campaign to 
demoralize the Japanese people could have been accomplished more swiftly and with considerably 
less loss of life. In the aftermath of the K~sovo air campaign, Loral Space and Communications 
Limited said it might be forced to cut transmissions into Yugoslavia from one of its satellites under 
the general trade embargo that was proposed by the United States. Fortunately, State Department 
spokesperson James Rubin quickly denied that there were plans to interfere ,vith Internet access 
for citizens of Yugoslavia . 
7. Indeed, the Serbian news sources that remained in Internet communication provided useful 
information to American citizens and the American press. During the recent NATO bombing of 
Yugoslavia, I got my news of the progress of the bombing attacks from Belgrade and other Serbian 
Internet sources. I soon found out that the New York Times and the Washingtoll Post were getting 
their information from the same Internet sources that I was using. What reason did we have to trust 
any of this information when we knew that the Milosevic government was censoring it? Let us take 
a specific case: a building in downtown Belgrade is struck by a missile, and the collateral damage in 
fact kills ten civilians. Now the Serbian Internet could inflate the casualties and say there were 50 
civilians killed. But this kind of inflation, repeated over many bombings, could intimidate and 
terrorize the population of the city, and Milosevic could be counted on not to want to do that. All 
right, take the opposite extreme: they report no civilian deaths. But that falsification would 
encourage NATO to increase the bombardment, figuring that it is a surgically precise destruction 
of Serbian infrastructure with no loss of civilian life. So the safest path, the path of the least chance 
of government interference, is simply to report the accurate number of deaths, in this case ten. And 
as the Times and the Post, and I for that matter, discovered in the course of the war when there was 
independent empirical verification, Serbian Internet information about the bombings was by and 
large rather close to accuracy. 
8. I believe that the United States has far more to lose if our computer networks are attacked 
than we could ever hope to gain by attacking the computer networks of other countries. Earlier in 
this conference someone shrugged off the damage that might happen to our banking and 
brokerage system by saying, "Well, so what if the Dow Jones drops 30%?" If that is all that happens, 
I would agree. But that is not what is going to happen. What ,vill happen is people across the nation 
will find their Internet connections down and the television saying, "Don't worry, you haven'tlost 
your life's savings." And they ,vill call their banks and stock brokers and get a busy signal. And the 
word \vill sweep the nation that credit cards are no longer going to be accepted, and if you have 
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some hard cash on hand that is the only thing that will get you food. And there will be riots in every 
city and village, and people ,vill raid the grocery stores and steal all the food. You and everyone else 
,vill fear that all their money-in banks, in stock accounts, in retirement plans-may have been 
wiped out by the Internet attack. Even iflater it turns out that there was enough redundancy in the 
storage system to retrieve many of the financial records, it may come too late to prevent riots and 
insurrections. The dimensions of a national disaster of this kind could fur surpass anything in our 
nation's history. 
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